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Abstract
Parent-identifying schemes provide a way to identify causes from effects for some information systems such as digital
fingerprinting and group testing. In this paper, we consider combinatorial structures for parent-identifying schemes. First, we
establish an equivalent relationship between parent-identifying schemes and forbidden configurations. Based on this relationship,
we derive probabilistic existence lower bounds for two related combinatorial structures, that is, t-parent-identifying set systems (t-
IPPS) and t-multimedia parent-identifying codes (t-MIPPC), which are used in broadcast encryption and multimedia fingerprinting
respectively. The probabilistic lower bound for the maximum size of a t-IPPS has the asymptotically optimal order of magnitude
in many cases, and that for t-MIPPC provides the asymptotically optimal code rate when t = 2 and the best known asymptotic
code rate when t ≥ 3. Furthermore, we analyze the structure of 2-IPPS and prove some bounds for certain cases.
Index Terms
Parent-identifying scheme, forbidden configuration, probabilistic construction, graph removal lemma.
I. INTRODUCTION
The elucidation of cause-effect relationships among variables or events is the central aim of many studies, see preface of
Pearl’s book [24]. Parent-identifying schemes provide a way to identify causes from an effect for some information systems
such as digital fingerprinting and group testing.
We use the terminology of f -channel to represent a kind of cause-effect relationship, which has at most t inputs (causes)
and a collection of possible outputs (effects). Let Q be a finite alphabet of cardinality |Q| = q, in which elements represent
possible causes. Let Qn = {c = (c(1), . . . , c(n)) : c(i) ∈ Q}, and 2Q denote the power set of Q. We define f -channel as a
function f from subsets of some ground set, which will be Qn or 2Q in our settings, to subsets of the same ground set. Two
most interesting particular choices of f will be described below.
Definition 1: A subset C of Qn or 2Q is a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel if for any C′ ⊆ C with |C′| ≤ t
and any d ∈ f(C′), we have ⋂
P⊆C: |P|≤t, d∈f(P)
P 6= ∅. (1)
The above definition exhibits the essential idea of cause clarification algorithms in parent-identifying schemes, that is, once
an effect d is observed then at least one cause can be found which is common to all subsets P ⊆ C with size at most t capable
of generating d. If d can be generated by P , then we call d a descendant of P and call P a possible parent set of d.
A set C ⊆ Qn is called a q-ary code of length n and each c ∈ C is called a codeword. In Definition 1, if C ⊆ Qn, then
it can be regarded as a class of fingerprinting codes used in digital copyright protection. Well-known examples include codes
with the t-identifiable parent property (t-IPP codes) [3]–[6], [22], [27], [29], where
f(P) = desc(P) = P(1)× P(2)× · · · × P(n), (2)
and P(i) = {c(i) : c ∈ P} is the ith projection of the set P .
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2In the case when C is a collection of subsets of Q, i.e., C ⊆ 2Q, we call C a set system. The following particular example,
namely, t-single-user tracing superimposed family, was introduced for applications in molecular biology [1], [15], where
f(P) =
{ ⋃
A∈P
A
}
. (3)
The f -channel described by (3) is known as OR-(multiple-access) channel and codes for this channel are called superimposed
codes, which were introduced half a century ago in [23], see also [18], [19]. Note that the aim of superimposed codes is to
identify the whole set P by its output {d} = f(P), and the aim of t-single-user tracing superimposed family is to identify
at least one element which belongs to all P such that {d} = f(P), where d = ⋃A∈P A. For t-parent-identifying set systems
(t-IPPS) considered in this paper, the corresponding f -channel is described by
f(P) =
{
B : |B| ≥ w,B ⊆
⋃
A∈P
A
}
. (4)
In some sense, this f -channel is more complicated than the channel (3) because its output is not a single subset but a family
of subsets.
In this paper, we investigate parent-identifying set systems (IPPS) for broadcast encryption and multimedia parent-identifying
codes (MIPPC) for multimedia fingerprinting. We focus on their (maximum) sizes (or in other words, code rates), one of the
most important parameters, of such parent-identifying schemes. The best known upper bounds for the size of t-IPPS and
t-MIPPC were proved in [21] and [9] respectively. In the literature, there are no general lower bounds for the maximum size
of t-IPPS and t-MIPPC. In this paper, we will provide probabilistic constructions for t-IPPS and t-MIPPC, and compare their
cardinalities with the known upper bounds respectively.
To that end, first, we establish an equivalent relationship between parent-identifying schemes and forbidden configurations.
Based on this relationship, we derive probabilistic existence results for IPPS and MIPPC respectively. Accordingly, the
probabilistic lower bound for t-IPPS has the asymptotically optimal order of magnitude in many cases, and that for t-MIPPC
provides the asymptotically optimal code rate when t = 2 and the best known asymptotic code rate when t ≥ 3. Furthermore,
we analyze the structure of 2-IPPS and prove some bounds for certain cases.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section II, we state the definition of forbidden configuration, and establish an
equivalent relationship between it and parent-identifying schemes. In Section III, we provide the probabilistic construction for
t-IPPS and derive some bounds for 2-IPPS with small w. We show the probabilistic existence result for t-MIPPC in Section
IV. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V.
II. FORBIDDEN CONFIGURATIONS
A. Configuration
In [5], Barg et al. exploited the notion of minimal forbidden configuration to study codes with the t-identifiable parent
property. We recap the related notions here.
Definition 2: In a set C, let F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} be a collection of subsets of C with Fi ⊆ C, |Fi| ≤ t, i = 1, . . . ,m. Then
F is called a configuration if it has an empty intersection, i.e. ⋂1≤i≤m Fi = ∅. Moreover, F is called a minimal configuration
if it is minimal under inclusion, that is, ⋂
1≤j≤m,
j 6=i
Fj 6= ∅, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Denote U(F) = ⋃1≤i≤m Fi. The cardinality of U(F) is called the size of the configuration F . The following lemma shows
that the size of a minimal configuration cannot be too large, which was shown in [5], [27]. To be self-contained, we expose
its proof here. Denote u := b( t2 + 1)2c.
Lemma 1 ([5], [27]): Let F be a minimal configuration. Then |U(F)| ≤ u.
Proof: Suppose F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} be a minimal configuration. Then for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there exists a codeword xi
such that
xi /∈ Fi and xi ∈
⋂
1≤j≤m,
j 6=i
Fj .
3Clearly, xi 6= xj for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m. Therefore
|U(F)| = |{x1,x2, . . . ,xm}|+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
1≤i≤m
Fi \ {x1, . . . ,xm}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ m+
∑
1≤i≤m
(|Fi| − (m− 1))
≤ m+m(t−m+ 1)
= −m2 + (t+ 2)m
≤ ( t
2
+ 1)2.
where the last inequality holds by taking m = t2 + 1. The lemma follows.
B. Relationship
To establish the relationship between a parent-identifying scheme and a (minimal) configuration, first, we define a forbidden
configuration as follows.
Definition 3: Let C be a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel. A (minimal) forbidden configuration in C is a
(minimal) configuration F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} such that
f(F1) ∩ f(F2) ∩ · · · ∩ f(Fm) 6= ∅.
The following relationship is from Lemma 1 and Definitions 1 and 3.
Proposition 1: A set C is a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel if and only if there are no minimal forbidden
configurations in C with size at most u.
Proof: Indeed, if C is a t-parent-identifying scheme, then by the definition there are no forbidden configurations and hence
no minimal forbidden configurations. If C is not a t-parent-identifying scheme then there exists a subset C′ ⊆ C, |C′| ≤ t, and
a descendant d ∈ f(C′) such that ⋂
P∈Pt(d)
P = ∅.
Then we can find a minimal forbidden configuration in
Pt(d) = {P ⊆ C : |P| ≤ t, d ∈ f(P)}.
This is doable since we can consecutively remove some P from Pt(d), if the intersection of remaining subsets is still empty,
until it forms a minimal configuration. Then according to Lemma 1, the size of any minimal configuration is at most u. The
proof is completed.
By Proposition 1, we immediately have
Corollary 1: A set C is a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel if and only if every subset C′ ⊆ C such that |C′| ≤ u
is a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel.
Notice that different f -channels lead to different parent-identifying schemes. By Proposition 1, different parent-identifying
schemes correspond to different minimal forbidden configurations. To derive a lower bound for the maximum size of a parent-
identifying scheme, we can use the method of random coding with expurgation, that is, to estimate the expectation number of
its corresponding minimal forbidden configurations, and then delete one element from each of them to destroy these minimal
forbidden configurations. In the following sections, we will exhibit probabilistic existence results for IPPS and MIPPC in this
way.
III. BOUNDS FOR IPPS
A. Parent-identifying set system
In broadcast encryption, the distributor broadcasts the encrypted data and sends a valid key to each authorized user. To
protect the copyright of broadcasted contents, the distributor will send different users with distinct keys, which represent their
own identification. In fact, the authorized keys are essentially the same with the embedded fingerprints in digital fingerprinting.
4Both of them aim to resist collusion attacks. This kind of key-distributing schemes has already been investigated, see [12]–[14],
[21], [28] for example.
Suppose the distributor has a set of base keys X with size v. We also call an element x ∈ X a point. According to [28]
an authorized user can receive w(≤ v) distinct base keys from the distributor and use it to decrypt the broadcast-encrypted
contents based on a threshold secret sharing scheme [8], [25]. Hence the set of all authorized users’ fingerprints is a subset
B ⊆ (Xw), where (Xw) denotes the set of all w-subsets of X and each authorized user b receives its own w-subset B ∈ B.
The pair (X ,B) is called a (w, v) set system, and each B ∈ B is called a block. It is often assumed that at most t dishonest
authorized users B′ ⊆ B would collude to generate a pirate fingerprint T such that T ⊆ ⋃B∈B′ B and |T | = w, that is, the
corresponding set system’s f -channel is defined as
fss(B′) =
{
T ⊆ X : |T | = w, T ⊆
⋃
B∈B′
B
}
.
To resist this kind of attack, the parent-identifying set systems were defined in [14].
Definition 4: A t-parent-identifying set system, denoted as t-IPPS(w, v), is a pair (X ,B) such that |X | = v, B ⊆ (Xw),
with the property that for any w-subset T ⊆ X , either Pt(T ) is empty, or⋂
P∈Pt(T )
P 6= ∅,
where
Pt(T ) =
{
P ⊆ B : |P| ≤ t, T ⊆
⋃
B∈P
B
}
.
The number of blocks B ∈ B is called the size of this t-IPPS(w, v). Denote It(w, v) as the maximum size of a t-IPPS(w, v).
A t-IPPS(w, v) (X ,B) is called optimal if it has size It(w, v).
B. A lower bound for t-IPPS
According to Definition 3, we have the following description of the forbidden configuration in an IPPS. Let (X ,B) be a
t-IPPS(w, v). A (minimal) forbidden configuration F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} in B is a (minimal) configuration in B such that∣∣∣∣∣
( ⋃
B∈F1
B
)
∩
( ⋃
B∈F2
B
)
∩ · · · ∩
( ⋃
B∈Fm
B
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ w.
Therefore we have the following lemma in this setting.
Lemma 2: If a minimal forbidden configuration F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} contains s distinct blocks, where 2 ≤ s ≤ u, then it
is spanned by at most (s− 1)w points, that is,∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
B∈U(F)
B
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
1≤i≤m
(
⋃
B∈Fi
B)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ min{(s− 1)w, v}.
Proof: Suppose F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} is a minimal forbidden configuration with size |U(F)| = s. Then there exists a
w-subset W ⊆ X such that
W ⊆
⋃
B∈Fi
B, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Thus each point in W appears in at least two distinct blocks of U(F), since if not, it contradicts that F is a configuration. If
one counts points with multiplicities in all blocks B belonging to the configuration F , then the corresponding sum equals to
sw points. Since all points of W were counted at least twice in this sum, the number of distinct points in
⋃
B∈U(F)B is at
most sw − w. The lemma follows.
Combining Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, we have
Corollary 2: If a set system (X ,B) is not a t-IPPS(w, v), then there exists an s-subset U ⊆ B, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, such that U
is spanned by at most (s− 1)w points.
For convenience, we introduce the notion of a bad s-packet as follows.
Definition 5: An s-subset U ⊆ (Xw), 2 ≤ s ≤ u, is called a bad s-packet if it is spanned by at most (s− 1)w points.
5Now we are going to prove the existence of good t-IPPS(w, v) for fixed w and sufficiently large v. We are interested in
the asymptotic behavior of the size of good t-IPPS(w, v) for fixed t and w. We shall show that bad s-packets are not typical
in the case sw  v, therefore their probability is rather small and then we shall prove the existence of good set systems by
using some variation of the random coding technique. Note that it is reasonable to consider large v and relatively small w.
Indeed, the distributor needs a large set of base keys to accommodate amounts of authorized users, however, each authorized
user is usually assigned with a limited number of base keys which are used as the user’s inputs to the decryption devices.
Also, the interested reader is referred to [17] for the case that w is a constant fraction of v, which was studied via constant
weight codes.
The process of deriving a lower bound for t-IPPS in Theorem 1 is to first randomly choose a family of blocks from
(X
w
)
,
and then remove one block from each bad s-packet, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, which may form a possible minimal forbidden configuration.
Theorem 1: Let w and t be positive integers such that t ≥ 2. Then there exists a constant c, depending only on w and t,
with the following property. For any sufficiently large integer v, there exists a t-IPPS(w, v) with size at least cv
w
u−1 , that is,
It(w, v) ≥ cv wu−1 .
Proof: Let X be a finite set of v points. Let (Xw) be the collection of all w-subsets (blocks) B ⊆ X . Form a random
subset B ⊆ (Xw) of blocks by including each block independently with probability p, where 0 < p < 1. We will determine the
value of p later.
Let V denote the number of blocks in B. Clearly, E[V ] = (vw)p.
Let X denote the number of all bad s-packets, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, in B.
For any s-subset U ⊆ (Xw), 2 ≤ s ≤ u, let X(U) be the indicator random variable for the event U ⊆ B. Then
Pr{X(U)} = ps
as all s blocks in U must be chosen to be in B.
So by the linearity of expectation,
E[X] =
∑
U is a bad s-packet in
(X
w
)
,
2≤s≤u
Pr{X(U)}
=
∑
2≤s≤u
Nsp
s,
(5)
where Ns is the number of bad s-packets in
(X
w
)
.
For each 2 ≤ s ≤ u, we have
Ns ≤
(
v
(s− 1)w
)(((s−1)w
w
)
s
)
. (6)
Indeed, since each bad s-packet is spanned by at most (s − 1)w points, so any (s − 1)w points in X may generate up to(((s−1)ww )
s
)
bad s-packets in X . There are ( v(s−1)w) distinct subsets of size (s− 1)w in X . The inequality (6) for Ns follows.
From (5) and (6),
E[X] ≤
∑
2≤s≤u
(
v
(s− 1)w
)(((s−1)w
w
)
s
)
ps.
So again by the linearity of expectation,
E[V −X] = E[V ]− E[X]
≥
(
v
w
)
p−
∑
2≤s≤u
(
v
(s− 1)w
)(((s−1)w
w
)
s
)
ps.
(7)
Take p = c0v
(2−u)w
u−1 , where c0 is a constant chosen appropriately and depending only on w and t. Note that for fixed w, t
and sufficiently large v, the value of p always can be chosen such that 0 < p < 1. Since t, w, u are fixed, then it follows from
(7) that for sufficiently large v
E[V −X] ≥ c1vwp− c2v(u−1)wpu − c3
∑
2≤s≤u−1
v(s−1)wps
≥ c0c1vwv
(2−u)w
u−1 − cu0c2v(u−1)wv
(2−u)uw
u−1 − cu−10 c3
≥ cv wu−1 ,
6where c1, c2, c3 and c are constants depending only on w and t.
Thus there exists at least one point in the probability space for which the difference V −X is at least cv wu−1 . That is, there
is a family of blocks B which has at least cv wu−1 more blocks than bad s-packets, 2 ≤ s ≤ u. Delete one block from each
bad s-packets, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, in B, leaving a set B′. This set B′ contains no bad s-packet, nor minimal forbidden configuration
containing s blocks, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, and has at least cv wu−1 blocks.
Thus the theorem follows by Corollary 2.
C. Remark
In the literature, the best known upper bound for IPPS is as follows.
Theorem 2 ([21]): Let v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2 be integers. Then
It(w, v) ≤
(
v
d wbt2/4c+te
)
= O(v
d wbt2/4c+t e).
In [21], it was conjectured that Theorem 2 provides the exact upper bound for t-IPPS(w, v), up to a constant depending
only on w and t. The lower bound for t-IPPS(w, v) in Theorem 1 confirms their conjecture for certain cases. That is, when
bt2/4c+ t is a divisor of w and v is large, the probabilistic construction in Theorem 1 produces t-IPPS(w, v) with size cv wu−1 ,
which has the same (optimal) order of magnitude wu−1 =
w
bt2/4c+t as that of the upper bound in Theorem 2.
We remark that when v is large, even if bt2/4c+ t is not a divisor of w, the lower bound for t-IPPS(w, v) in Theorem 1 has
order of magnitude wbt2/4c+t , which is extremely close to the order of magnitude d wbt2/4c+te of the upper bound in Theorem 2.
Also very recently, Shangguan and Tamo [26] slightly improved this asymptotic lower bound for certain w and t by connecting
IPPS with sparse hypergraphs.
D. 2-IPPS with small w
In the preceding subsection we provided a probabilistic lower bound for the maximum size of t-IPPS(w, v) with general
t and w. In this subsection we concentrate on the case of t = 2, small w, and v is any integer no less than w. We aim to
determine the exact value of It(w, v) in certain cases.
First we have the following lemma for a 2-IPPS(w, v), which is essentially the same as Lemma 1 in [22], and we omit its
verification here.
Lemma 3: A (w, v) set system (X ,B) is a 2-IPPS(w, v) if and only if the following cases hold.
(IPPSa) For any three distinct blocks A,B,C ∈ B, we have
|(A ∪B) ∩ (A ∪ C) ∩ (B ∪ C)| < w.
(IPPSb) For any four distinct blocks A,B,C,D ∈ B, we have
|(A ∪B) ∩ (C ∪D)| < w.
By virtue of a construction for traceability schemes in [21], we have
Lemma 4: For any v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have
It(w, v) ≥ v − w + 1.
Proof: We provide a construction as in [21]. Suppose X is the set of points such that |X | = v. Arbitrarily choose a subset
∆ ⊆ X such that |∆| = w − 1. Define
Bj := {j} ∪∆ ⊆ X , ∀j ∈ X \∆,
and denote B := {Bj : j ∈ X \∆}. Then (X ,B) is a t-IPPS(w, v) for any t ≥ 2, since besides the common subset ∆, each
block possesses a unique point. The lemma follows.
The following corollary follows from Lemma 4 and Theorem 2.
Corollary 3: For any v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2 such that w ≤ bt2/4c+ t, we have
v − w + 1 ≤ It(w, v) ≤ v.
Now we start from the case w = 2.
7Theorem 3: For any v ≥ 2 and t ≥ 2, we have It(2, v) = v − 1.
Proof: From Corollary 3, we have v − 1 ≤ It(2, v) ≤ v. Since It(2, v) ≤ I2(2, v) for any t ≥ 2, it suffices to prove that
I2(2, v) < v. Suppose not, and (X ,B) is a 2-IPPS(2, v) with size |B| = v. We aim to find a contradiction to the definition of
IPPS.
First there exists one point x ∈ X such that x appears in at least two distinct blocks, since if not, then |B| ≤ v/2, a
contradiction to the hypothesis that |B| = v. Denote b(x) = |{B ∈ B : x ∈ B}|. We have 2 ≤ b(x) ≤ v− 1. Notice that there
exists another point y ∈ X \ {x} such that y appears in at least two blocks, since d 2v−b(x)v−1 e = 2. Without loss of generality,
we assume that A,B ∈ B are two distinct blocks containing x, and C,D ∈ B are two distinct blocks containing y. Note that
{A,B} 6= {C,D}. If |{A,B,C,D}| = 3, then, without loss of generality, assume A = C = {x, y}. It implies A ⊆ B ∪D,
a contradiction to Lemma 3 (IPPSa). If |{A,B,C,D}| = 4, then {x, y} ⊆ (A ∪ C) ∩ (B ∪D), a contradiction to Lemma 3
(IPPSb). Thus I2(2, v) < v and the lemma follows.
For w ≥ 3, we have an observation.
Proposition 2: Let v ≥ w ≥ 3 and (X ,B) be a 2-IPPS(w, v). If there exist two distinct blocks A,B ∈ B such that
|A ∩B| = w − 1, then |B| ≤ v − w + 1.
Proof: With the assumption, we first claim that for any point x ∈ X \ (A∩B), x is contained in at most one block in B.
Suppose not, then there exists one point x0 ∈ X \ (A ∩B) contained in two blocks C,D ∈ B. Clearly, {A,B} 6= {C,D}. If
|{A,B,C,D}| = 3, then, without loss of generality, assume A = C. It implies that any two blocks of A,B,D can generate a
w-subset (A∩B)∪{x0}, a contradiction to Lemma 3 (IPPSa). If |{A,B,C,D}| = 4, then (A∩B)∪{x0} ⊆ (A∪C)∩(B∪D),
a contradiction to Lemma 3 (IPPSb). Thus the claim follows.
Based on the above claim, B with the maximum number of blocks is from the construction in Lemma 4, where ∆ = A∩B.
It implies |B| ≤ v − w + 1, as desired.
Here we remark that if one would like to explore the exact value of I2(w, v), v ≥ w ≥ 3, the first step might be required
to analyze the set systems with block size w and
max{|B1 ∩B2| : B1, B2 ∈ B, B1 6= B2} ≤ w − 2.
E. An upper bound for 2-IPPS(4, v)
From Section III-C, we know that for fixed w, t such that (bt2/4c + t)|w, It(w, v) = Θ
(
v
w
bt2/4c+t
)
. However when
(bt2/4c + t) - w, the order of magnitude of It(w, v) is shown to be between wbt2/4c+t and d wbt2/4c+te. Thus it is interesting
and desirable to determine the exact order of magnitude of It(w, v) when (bt2/4c+ t) - w. In this subsection we consider the
first case t = 2 and w = 4. By Theorems 1 and 2, for sufficiently large v, we have
cv4/3 ≤ I2(4, v) ≤ 1
2
v2,
where c is a positive constant. In the sequel, we will prove
Theorem 4: I2(4, v) = o(v2).
Before proving Theorem 4, we do some preparations. Let (X ,B) be a (w, v) set system and B ∈ B. A subset E ⊆ B is
called an |E|-own-subset of B if for any B′ ∈ B \ {B}, we have E * B′. We have the following observations.
Proposition 3: In a set system (X ,B), the number of blocks in B that contain at least one 1-own-subset is at most v.
The above proposition shows that for any set system (X ,B), one can remove at most v blocks from B to satisfy that each
of the remaining blocks in B does not contain any 1-own-subset. Next we focus on the case that a set system (X ,B) such that
• max{|B1 ∩B2| : B1, B2 ∈ B, B1 6= B2} ≤ 2,
• for any B ∈ B and any x ∈ B, there exists B′ ∈ B \ {B} such that x ∈ B′. (8)
Proposition 4: Let (X ,B) be a 2-IPPS(4, v). If there exist two distinct blocks B1, B2 ∈ B such that |B1 ∩B2| = 2, then
there does not exist B′ ∈ B \ {B1, B2} such that Bi \ (B1 ∩B2) ⊆ B′, where i = 1, 2.
Proof: Suppose not, without loss of generality, we assume that there exists B′ ∈ B\{B1, B2} such that B1\(B1∩B2) ⊆ B′.
Then B1 ⊆ (B2 ∪B′), a contradiction to Lemma 3 (IPPSa).
Moreover, we have
8Lemma 5: Let (X ,B) be a 2-IPPS(4, v) such that (8) is satisfied. Then
|{B ∈ B : ∃B′ ∈ B \ {B} such that |B ∩B′| = 2}| ≤ v − 1. (9)
Proof: Suppose on the contrary that the left-hand side of (9) is no less than v. Then we would like to find a contradiction
to that (X ,B) is a 2-IPPS(4, v).
To this end, we construct a graph G = (X , E), where X is the vertex-set and E is the edge-set. For each B ∈ {B ∈ B :
∃B′ ∈ B \ {B} s.t. |B ∩B′| = 2}, the 2-subset B \ (B ∩B′) forms an edge in E , where B′ is a block in B \ {B} such that
|B ∩B′| = 2. Note that a block B may contribute more than one edge to E . From Proposition 4, we have that any edge in E
only belongs to one block in B and any two edges in E arising from the same block are adjacent. According to the assumption
that the left-hand side of (9) is not less than v, we have |E| ≥ v. That is, G is a graph on a v-vertex-set containing more than
v − 1 edges. Hence there exists a cycle in G. Correspondingly, there exists a path of length 3 as Fig. 1. If a = d, the path is
Fig. 1: A path of length 3
a cycle of length 3. The following argument is divided into two cases.
Case 1. If a, b, c belong to the same block B ∈ B, then let B = {a, b, c, v1}, where v1 ∈ X \{a, b, c}. By the first assumption
of (8) and the way of constructing G, there exist B1 ∈ B \ {B} such that B ∩B1 = {c, v1}, and B2 ∈ B \ {B,B1} such that
B ∩B2 = {a, v1}. Since any two blocks in B intersect at at most two points, there exists a point x ∈ B1 but x /∈ B, x /∈ B2.
By the second assumption of (8), there exists a block B3 ∈ B\{B,B1, B2} such that x ∈ B3. Now we have |{a, c, v1, x}| = 4
and
{a, c, v1, x} ⊆ B ∪B3 and {a, c, v1, x} ⊆ B1 ∪B2.
However, {B,B3} and {B1, B2} are disjoint, which implies a contradiction to Lemma 3 (IPPSb).
Similarly, we can derive a contradiction to Lemma 3 when b, c, d belong to the same block of B.
Case 2. Now we consider the case that there does not exist any block B ∈ B such that {a, b, c} ⊆ B or {b, c, d} ⊆ B. Let
B1 = {a, b, v1, v2} ∈ B, where v1 6= v2, v1 /∈ {a, b, c} and v2 /∈ {a, b, c}. Let B2, B3 be the blocks such that {b, c} ⊆ B2 and
{c, d} ⊆ B3 respectively. Since {a, b, c} is not contained in any block of B, we have B1 6= B2 and B1 6= B3. Since {b, c, d}
is not contained in any block of B, we have B2 6= B3. By the way of constructing G, there exists B′1 ∈ B \ {B1} such that
B′1 ∩B1 = {v1, v2}. Then B′1 6= B2 follows from the first assumption of (8). Now we have |{b, c, v1, v2}| = 4 and
{b, c, v1, v2} ⊆ B1 ∪B2, {b, c, v1, v2} ⊆ B1 ∪B3 and {b, c, v1, v2} ⊆ B′1 ∪B2.
If B′1 = B3, then {b, c, v1, v2} can be generated by any two of B1, B2, B3, a contradiction to Lemma 3 (IPPSa). If B′1 6= B3,
then {B1, B3} and {B′1, B2} are disjoint but both of them can generate {b, c, v1, v2}, a contradiction to Lemma 3 (IPPSb).
This completes the proof.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4, and we need the following graph removal lemma [2]. In the literature, Alon et al.
[3], [4] used Lemma 6 to argue the upper bounds for codes with the identifiable parent property.
Lemma 6 ([2]): For every γ > 0 and every positive integer k, there exists a constant δ = δ(k, γ) > 0 such that every
graph G on n vertices, containing less than δnk copies of the complete graph Kk on k vertices, contains a set of less than
γn2 edges whose deletion destroys all copies of Kk in G.
Proof of Theorem 4: Proving Theorem 4 is equivalent to proving that for any  > 0, there exists v0 = v0() such that
for any v > v0, we have I2(4, v) < v2.
Suppose (X ,B) is a 2-IPPS(4, v) of size M . If there exist two distinct blocks B1, B2 ∈ B such that |B1 ∩ B2| = 3,
then Proposition 2 ensures that M ≤ v − 3, which implies I2(4, v) = o(v2). So we only need to consider the case that
max{|B1 ∩B2| : B1, B2 ∈ B, B1 6= B2} ≤ 2.
First, by Proposition 3 and Lemma 5, we can remove at most 2v blocks from B to make the remaining B′ satisfy that any
block does not contain any 1-own-subset and any two blocks intersect at at most one point. Clearly, |B′| ≤ |B| = M and
|B′| ≥ |B| − 2v = M − 2v.
9Now we construct a graph G = (X , E) by the following way: for each B ∈ B′, any 2-subset of B forms an edge in E .
Obviously, any block contributes
(
4
2
)
= 6 edges, which actually form a copy of the complete graph K4. Since any two distinct
blocks in B′ intersect at at most one point, any two copies of K4 in G that arise from two distinct blocks are edge-disjoint.
Hence, |E| ≥ 6(M − 2v). Accordingly, one needs to delete at least M − 2v edges from E to destroy all copies of the complete
graph K4 in G.
Assume that for sufficiently large v, we have M ≥ v2 for some  > 0. Then we need to delete at least M − 2v ≥ 2v2
edges from E to destroy all copies of K4 in G. By Lemma 6, let k = 4 and γ = 2 , we should have that G contains at least
δv4 copies of K4, where δ = δ() is a positive constant.
For these copies of K4 in G, the number of copies of K4 which contain at least two edges arising from the same block in
B′ is O(v3). Indeed, by an upper bound of 2-IPPS(4, v) in Theorem 2 that M ≤ (v2), there are at most (v2) ways to choose
a block in B′, and (62) = 15 ways to choose two edges from that block. The above process decides at least three vertices and
there are at most v − 3 ways to choose another vertex to form a copy of K4. Thus O(v3) follows.
Since G contains at least δv4 copies of K4, there exists a copy of K4 in which any two edges come from two different
blocks. Denote one such copy of K4 as Fig. 2. We can suppose that B1, B2, B3, B4 ∈ B′ are four distinct blocks such that
Fig. 2: A copy of K4
{a, b} ⊆ B1, {a, c} ⊆ B2, {b, d} ⊆ B3 and {c, d} ⊆ B4. Now we have |{a, b, c, d}| = 4 and
{a, b, c, d} ⊆ B1 ∪B4 and {a, b, c, d} ⊆ B2 ∪B3.
However, {B1, B4} and {B2, B3} are disjoint, which implies a contradiction to Lemma 3 (IPPSb).
Thus for any  > 0 and sufficiently large v, we have M < v2, as desired.
We remark that Theorem 4 can be generalized to the case t = 3 and w = 6 by a similar argument. Note that for any t ≥ 2,
w = b( t2 + 1)2c is the smallest w such that w > t and (bt2/4c + t) - w. However, for t ≥ 4 and w = u = b( t2 + 1)2c,
we might not be able to have a similar argument as that of Theorem 4. Since in a graph, we can only get 2t points from t
distinct edges, and the fact w = b( t2 + 1)2c > 2t for any t ≥ 4 implies that 2t points are not enough to form a w-subset.
But we believe that this obstacle can be removed by virtue of hypergraphs or some elaborate analyses. Precisely, we have the
following conjecture.
Conjecture 1: Suppose t ≥ 4 is a positive integer, then
It(w, v) = o(v
2),
where w = b( t2 + 1)2c.
IV. PROBABILISTIC EXISTENCE RESULT FOR MIPPC
A. Multimedia parent-identifying code
Fingerprinting in multimedia scenario was introduced in [30], and later further developed in [7], [11] and many other
publications. In this case, the set of all authorized users’ fingerprints is a code C ⊆ Qn. A pirate copy, generated by at most t
dishonest users C′ ⊆ C, can reflect the information of all traitors in C′, that is,
fm(C′) = {desc(C′)} = {C′(1)× C′(2)× · · · × C′(n)},
where
C′(i) = {c(i) ∈ Q : c = (c(1), . . . , c(n)) ∈ C′}.
The notion of codes with the identifiable parent property for multimedia fingerprinting was proposed in [9] for resisting the
averaging attack, which was claimed as one of the most feasible collusion attacks in [31].
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Definition 6: An (n, q) code C has the t-identifiable parent property for multimedia fingerprinting, denoted as t-MIPPC(n, q),
if for any subcode C′ ⊆ C such that |C′| ≤ t, we have ⋂
S∈St(C′)
S 6= ∅,
where
St(C′) = {S ⊆ C : |S| ≤ t, desc(S) = desc(C′)}.
The cardinality of C is called the size of this t-MIPPC(n, q). Denote Mt(n, q) as the maximum size of a t-MIPPC(n, q). A
t-MIPPC(n, q) C is optimal if it has size Mt(n, q). The code rate of a t-MIPPC(n, q) with size M is
Rq(n, t) =
logqM
n
,
and it is optimal provided M = Mt(n, q).
The above MIPPCs is a variation of IPP codes introduced by Hollmann, van Lint, Linnartz and Tolhuizen [22]. Also from
Definition 1 and formula (2), we state the definition of IPP codes as follows.
Definition 7: An (n, q) code C has the t-identifiable parent property, denoted as t-IPPC(n, q), if for any subcode C′ ⊆ C
such that |C′| ≤ t, and any d ∈ desc(C′), we have ⋂
P∈Pt(d)
P 6= ∅,
where
Pt(d) = {P ⊆ C : |P| ≤ t, d ∈ desc(P)}.
There is a relationship between MIPPC and IPPC.
Proposition 5 ([9]): A t-IPPC(n, q) is a t-MIPPC(n, q).
Based on this relationship and the known results on IPPC in [5], [6], we could have a lower bound for MIPPC. Namely,
lim
q→∞Rq(n, t) ≥
1
bt2/4c+ t . (10)
In the next subsection, we will show a much better lower bound than (10) for MIPPC.
B. A lower bound for t-MIPPC
From Definition 3, we have the following description of forbidden configurations in a t-MIPPC. Let C be a t-MIPPC, a
(minimal) forbidden configuration in C is a (minimal) configuration F = {F1, . . . ,Fm}, Fi ⊆ C, |Fi| ≤ t, i = 1, . . . ,m, such
that
desc(F1) = desc(F2) = · · · = desc(Fm),
that is, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
F1(i) = F2(i) = · · · = Fm(i).
By Proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4: An (n, q) code C is a t-MIPPC(n, q) if and only if there are no minimal forbidden configurations in C with
size at most u.
To use the expurgation method to derive a lower bound for t-MIPPC(n, q) in Theorem 5, first, we randomly choose some
words from Qn, next, we try to compute the expected number of the possible minimal forbidden configurations with size at
most u and delete one word from each of these possible minimal forbidden configurations.
Theorem 5: Let n and t be positive integers such that n ≥ 2, t ≥ 2. Then there exists a constant c, depending only on n
and t, with the following property. For any sufficiently large integer q, there exists a t-MIPPC(n, q) with size cq
tn
2t−1 , that is,
Mt(n, q) ≥ cq tn2t−1 .
Proof: Let Q = {0, 1, . . . , q−1} be a set of cardinality q. Choose words c1, c2, . . . , cM ∈ Qn uniformly and independently
at random, where M is an integer to be decided later. Denote C := {c1, c2, . . . , cM}.
Now we would like to remove some words from C to avoid the forbidden configurations of size at most u. To this end, we
first define the bad subfamily as follows. A subfamily U ⊆ C is called bad if there exist m subsets of U , say F1, . . . ,Fm,
such that
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(a) U = ⋃1≤i≤m Fi and |Fi| ≤ t for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
(b)
⋂
1≤i≤m Fi = ∅;
(c) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, F1(i) = F2(i) = · · · = Fm(i).
Note that the bad subfamilies here are different from the (minimal) forbidden configurations. From the natural setting, forbidden
configurations cannot be multi-sets while a bad subfamily might be a multi-subset of Qn.
Now we are going to compute the expected number of bad subfamilies in C with size at most u and remove one word
from each bad subfamily to obtain a t-MIPPC. It is clear that u ≥ 2t. The following process will be divided into two cases
according to the size of a bad subfamily: (1) the size is less than 2t; (2) the size is no less than 2t.
Case 1. We first consider the case when the size of a bad subfamily is less than 2t. Suppose U = {f1, . . . , fδ} ⊆ C is a bad
subfamily, where 2 ≤ δ < 2t. Then for each coordinate 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have a useful observation, that is,
|U(i)| = |{f1(i), . . . , fδ(i)}| ≤ δ
2
. (11)
Indeed, for each fj(i), 1 ≤ j ≤ δ, there exists another word fk ∈ U \ {fj} such that fk(i) = fj(i). If not, without loss
of generality, we may assume that f1(i) 6= fk(i) for any 2 ≤ k ≤ δ. Since U is a bad subfamily, there exist m subsets
F1, . . . ,Fm of U satisfying conditions (a), (b) and (c). By condition (a), there exists a subset Fs, 1 ≤ s ≤ m, such that
f1 ∈ Fs. Accordingly, f1(i) ∈ Fs(i). By condition (c), for any Fj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we have Fj(i) = Fs(i). Thus f1(i) ∈ Fj(i),
which implies f1 ∈ Fj . Accordingly,
f1 ∈
⋂
1≤j≤m
Fj 6= ∅,
which does not satisfy condition (b) and thus contradicts that U is a bad subfamily. Hence (11) follows. Actually, the right-hand
side of inequality (11) should be b δ2c, but we omit the floor-function symbol for convenience.
Based on the above observation, we estimate the probability of the event that a given δ-subfamily of C forms a bad subfamily.
In the following estimation, we always consider the case that q is much larger than n and t. Let U ⊆ C such that |U| = δ,
2 ≤ δ < 2t. Clearly, there are (Mδ ) distinct such U in C. Let X(U) be the event that U forms a bad subfamily. For each
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th coordinates U(i) contributes to the event X(U) with the probability at most(
q
δ/2
)
(δ/2)δ/qδ.
Since each coordinate contributes to the event X(U) independently, we have
Pr{X(U)} ≤
(
q
δ/2
)n
(δ/2)δn/qδn.
Therefore, the expectation number of bad subfamilies in C with size less than 2t is at most∑
2≤δ<2t
(
M
δ
)(
q
δ/2
)n
(δ/2)δn/qδn. (12)
Case 2. Next we consider the case when the size of a bad subfamily is no less than 2t. Suppose U = {f1, . . . , fγ} ⊆ C is a
bad subfamily, where 2t ≤ γ ≤ u. Similarly, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have an observation that
|U(i)| = |{f1(i), . . . , fγ(i)}| ≤ t. (13)
If not, then |U(i)| ≥ t + 1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that |{f1(i), . . . , ft+1(i)}| = t + 1. Since U is a bad
subfamily, there exist m subsets F1, . . . ,Fm of U satisfying conditions (a), (b) and (c). By condition (a), we know that F1(i)
contains at most t elements in U(i), and there exists another Fj , j 6= 1, such that
Fj(i) ∩ (U(i) \ F1(i)) 6= ∅.
However, this implies Fj(i) 6= F1(i), which contradicts condition (c) and implies that U is not a bad subfamily. Thus (13)
follows.
Now we are going to estimate the probability of the event that a given γ-subfamily of C forms a bad subfamily. Let U ⊆ C
such that |U| = γ, 2t ≤ γ ≤ u. Clearly, there are (Mγ ) distinct such U in C. Let X(U) be the event that U forms a bad
subfamily. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th coordinates U(i) contributes to the event X(U) with the probability at most(
q
t
)
tγ/qγ .
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Since each coordinate contributes to the event X(U) independently, we have
Pr{X(U)} ≤
(
q
t
)n
tγn/qγn.
Therefore, the expectation number of bad subfamilies in C with size ≥ 2t and ≤ u is at most∑
2t≤γ≤u
(
M
γ
)(
q
t
)n
tγn/qγn. (14)
Now we form a set B by choosing one word from each bad subfamily in C of size ≥ 2 and ≤ u. Then from (12) and (14),
we have
|B| ≤
∑
2≤δ<2t
(
M
δ
)(
q
δ/2
)n
(δ/2)δn/qδn +
∑
2t≤γ≤u
(
M
γ
)(
q
t
)n
tγn/qγn.
Define Cˆ = C \ B. Clearly, any two words in Cˆ are distinct, since we have removed one word from each bad subfamily of
size 2. Moreover,
|Cˆ| = |C| − |B|
≥M −
∑
2≤δ<2t
(
M
δ
)(
q
δ/2
)n(
δ
2q
)δn
−
∑
2t≤γ≤u
(
M
γ
)(
q
t
)n(
t
q
)γn
.
(15)
We claim that Cˆ is a t-MIPPC. Since if not, by Corollary 4, there would exist a minimal forbidden configuration with size at
most u. Correspondingly, there would exist a bad subfamily of size at most u. But we have already destroyed all bad subfamilies
in C by removing one word from each of them. The definitions of (minimal) forbidden configuration and bad subfamily are
inner definitions, i.e., these properties do not depend on a code in whole. Thus there does not exist any forbidden configuration
with size at most u in Cˆ. Hence Cˆ is a t-MIPPC.
For sufficiently large q, let M = q
tn
2t−1 , where  is a constant chosen appropriately and depending only on n and t.
Substituting it into (15), we have
|Cˆ| ≥M −
∑
2≤δ<2t
(
M
δ
)(
q
δ/2
)n(
δ
2q
)δn
−
∑
2t≤γ≤u
(
M
γ
)(
q
t
)n(
t
q
)γn
≥M − κ1
∑
2≤δ<2t
M δq−δn/2 − κ2
∑
2t≤γ≤u
Mγq(t−γ)n
= M − κ2M2tq−tn − κ1
∑
2≤δ≤2t−1
M δq−δn/2 − κ2
∑
2t≤γ≤u,
γ 6=2t
Mγq(t−γ)n
≥ q tn2t−1 − κ22tq tn2t−1 − κ′1q
n
2 − κ′2q
n
2t−1
≥ cq tn2t−1 ,
where κ1, κ2, κ′1, κ
′
2 and c are constants depending only on n and t. The theorem follows.
C. Remarks
In [9], Cheng et al. transferred the requirement of a t-MIPPC to a corresponding bipartite graph without cycles of length
≤ 2t, obtaining the following upper bound.
Theorem 6 ([9]): Let n, t, q be positive integers. Then
Mt(n, q) ≤

q
n
2 (q
n
2t + 2c) if n is even
q
n
2 (q
n+1
2t + c(q
1
2 + q−
1
2 )) if n is odd and t is even
q
n
2 (q
n
2t + c(q
1
2 + q−
1
2 )) if n is odd and t is odd,
where c is a constant depending only on t.
From Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, we have
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(n, t) (3, 2) (2, 3) (4, 4) (6, 5) (8, 6) (9, 7) (13, 10) (15, 11) (17, 12) (19, 13)
limq→∞Rq(n, t) ≥ 2/3 0.6 0.571 0.556 0.545 0.538 0.526 0.524 0.522 0.52
limq→∞Rq(n, t) ≤ 2/3 0.667 0.625 0.583 0.563 0.571 0.554 0.545 0.544 0.538
TABLE I Bounds for t-MIPPC of length n
Corollary 5: Let n and t be positive integers, then
t
2t− 1 ≤ limq→∞Rq(n, t) ≤

1
2 +
1
2t if n is even
1
2 + max{n+12tn , 12n} if n is odd and t is even
1
2 + max{ 12t , 12n} if n is odd and t is odd.
In Table I, we list the comparison in Corollary 5 for certain parameters, which shows that the gap is very small.
Furthermore, we compare the code rate of a t-MIPPC with another kind of multimedia fingerprinting code, namely, t¯-
separable code. Separable code was introduced in [11] and was studied by several authors, see [7], [10], [16], [20], [32] for
example.
When t = 2, it was proved that a 2-MIPPC is exactly a 2¯-separable code [9]. In Theorem 5, for fixed n such that
n ≡ 0 (mod 3) and sufficiently large q, the asymptotic code rate of a 2-MIPPC could be at least 2/3, which matches the
asymptotically optimal code rate of 2¯-separable code in [7] and [20]. This implies that, in Theorem 5, the expurgation method
provides the 2-MIPPC with asymptotically optimal code rate when n is a multiple of 3 and q is large.
For fixed n ≥ 2, t ≥ 3 and sufficiently large q, Blackburn [7] proved that, when (t− 1)|n, the asymptotically optimal code
rate of a t¯-separable code is 1/(t− 1). However, by Corollary 5, the fact
t
2t− 1 >
1
t− 1
implies that a t-MIPPC may provide much more codewords than a t¯-separable code.
Finally, we make a comparison between MIPPC and IPPC. It was proved in [6] that for fixed n ≥ 2, t ≥ 2 such that
(bt2/4c+ t)|n, the asymptotically optimal code rate of a t-IPPC(n, q) is 1/(bt2/4c+ t). Thus Corollary 5 and the fact
t
2t− 1 >
1
bt2/4c+ t
show that a t-MIPPC has a much larger asymptotic code rate than a t-IPPC.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered combinatorial structures for parent-identifying schemes. First we established an equivalent rela-
tionship between parent-identifying schemes and forbidden configurations. Based on this relationship, we derived probabilistic
existence results for IPPS and MIPPC respectively. The probabilistic lower bound for the maximum size of t-IPPS has the
asymptotically optimal order of magnitude in many cases, and that for t-MIPPC provides the asymptotically optimal code rate
when t = 2 and the best known asymptotic code rate when t ≥ 3. We analyzed the structure of 2-IPPS and proved some
bounds for certain cases. However, there is still a gap between the known upper bounds and lower bounds for IPPS and MIPPC
in many other cases. It would be of interest to narrow the gap and further to determine the exact maximum size (or code rate)
for them.
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